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Abstract
Background: Performance-Based Financing (PBF) has been advanced as a solution to contribute to improving 
the performance of health systems in developing countries. This is the case in Benin. This study aims to analyse 
how two PBF approaches, piloted in Benin, behave during implementation and what effects they produce, through 
investigating how local stakeholders perceive the introduction of PBF, how they adapt the different approaches 
during implementation, and the behavioural interactions induced by PBF.
Methods: The research rests on a socio-anthropological approach and qualitative methods. The design is a case 
study in two health districts selected on purpose. The selection of health facilities was also done on purpose, until 
we reached saturation of information. Information was collected through observation and semi-directive interviews 
supported by an interview guide. Data was analysed through contents and discourse analysis.
Results: The Ministry of Health (MoH) strongly supports PBF, but it is not well integrated with other ongoing 
reforms and processes. Field actors welcome PBF but still do not have a sense of ownership about it. The two PBF 
approaches differ notably as for the organs in charge of verification. Performance premiums are granted according 
to a limited number of quantitative indicators plus an extensive qualitative checklist. PBF matrices and verification 
missions come in addition to routine monitoring. Local stakeholders accommodate theoretical approaches. Globally, 
staff is satisfied with PBF and welcomes additional supervision and training. Health providers reckon that PBF 
forces them to depart from routine, to be more professional and to respect national norms. A major issue is the 
perceived unfairness in premium distribution. Even if health staff often refer to financial premiums, actually the 
latter are probably too weak—and ‘blurred’—to have a lasting inciting effect. It rather seems that PBF motivates 
health workers through other elements of its ‘package’, especially formative supervisions.
Conclusion: If the global picture is quite positive, several issues could jeopardise the success of PBF. It appears 
crucial to reduce the perceived unfairness in the system, notably through enhancing all facilities’ capacities to ensure 
they are in line with national norms, as well as to ensure financial and institutional sustainability of the system.
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Implications for policy makers
• Performance-Based Financing (PBF) in Benin is promising but it should be better integrated with other ongoing reforms and processes.
• It seems that PBF motivates health workers especially through formative supervisions.
• A major issue that jeopardises its success is the perceived unfairness of PBF towards operational staff; this should be responded, notably 
through enhancing all facilities’ capacities, distributing premiums in favour of those who create results on the field, and possibly adapting 
indicators and checklists and/or providing extra incentives to encourage staff to work in disadvantaged areas.
Implications for public
Performance-Based Financing (PBF) has been introduced along different approaches in health facilities in Benin, in view of improv-
ing the quality of healthcare. According to our study based on local stakeholders’ perceptions, it is quite welcomed by health staff who 
recognise that it forces them to depart from routine, to be more professional and to respect national norms. Thus, it has the potential 
to contribute to improving the quality of health services. However, a number of design and institutional issues should be solved so as to 
ensure coherence with other reforms in the sector, fairness for health staff, proper functioning and sustainability of the system.
Key Messages 
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Introduction
Many public health systems in developing countries, especially 
in Africa, are confronted to structural and functioning 
problems leading to poor performance. Face to the failure of 
past reform strategies, Performance-Based Financing (PBF) 
– which can basically be defined as ‘a mechanism by which 
health providers are, at least partially, funded on the basis on 
their performance’ (1) – has been advanced as a new health 
reform approach to contribute to improving the performance 
of those systems (1,2)1. This is notably the case in Benin where 
several donors have piloted PBF programmes in the health 
sector, especially the Belgian Development Agency (BTC) 
and the World Bank (WB). In the context of a joint health 
system strengthening platform, the 34 health districts of the 
country should soon be covered by a partner supporting PBF. 
Dialogue has been initiated to harmonise the approaches 
pursued by the different promoters so as to scale PBF up in 
a unified way.
The two main PBF approaches experimented in Benin and 
studied in this paper diverge at several respects. They are both 
based on the separation of functions between four types of 
stakeholders – health service providers; those who supervise 
them and verify declared results; those who buy results; plus 
a regulatory body, namely the Ministry of Health (MoH) – 
and the principle of contracting their relationships. They 
both focus on the quality of healthcare. However, differences 
are noted at the levels of the policy formulation and design; 
institutions in place; indicators; and costs at stakes (6).
Following encouraging experiences in various countries, PBF 
in the health sector has now been adopted as pilots or national 
policy by many African countries and communities of practice 
have developed so as to share experiences and professionalise 
the business (4,5,7–9). However, the jury is still out as for 
its impact (10–12), and numerous theoretical and empirical 
studies mention possible contradictory effects linked to the 
introduction of PBF in a complex system (13–16). There is 
a growing amount of papers written on PBF, but a Cochrane 
systematic review of PBF in low and middle income countries 
points to the fact that more studies are necessary (11). 
Except for one case study in Uganda, most evaluations of 
PBF to date have been ‘black box’ studies, investigating the 
magnitude of the effects from PBF, in contrast to explaining 
how and why effects come about (‘open-box’) (15). Yet, 
understanding why and how PBF produces effects is crucial 
because PBF is actually an approach or ‘package’ with various 
1. There is a plethora of terms commonly used in this field. Witter et al. (3) con-
sider that “[t]he core features of PBF, as currently practiced in reform packages 
[…], are summarized as follows:
- They take a supply-side approach, meaning performance-based incentives 
are earned by service providers;
- Payments are targeted at individual health facilities and administrations, often 
with trickle-down to health workers;
- There is most often some split of functions between regulation, purchasing, 
fund-holding, verification and service delivery, although the practices vary by 
context;
- Payments are linked to outputs, modified by quality indicators.
[…] The core concept is to promote a results-orientation by linking incentives 
to desired outputs and encouraging entrepreneurial behavior by staff and 
managers. This is done by establishing a set of more explicit contractual 
arrangements between different players. […] According to the definition adopted 
by the African PBF Community of Practice, in August 2010, PBF ‘applies market 
forces but seeks to correct market failures to attain health gains’”. See also (4) 
and (5) for more explanations about the PBF approach.
elements which differ from country to country. In Benin, the 
WB project was designed as a randomised control trial aimed 
at testing the effect of various designs, and will be soon subject 
to an impact evaluation. However, existing PBF pilots in the 
country did not include in the first place a ‘soft’ analysis on 
its implementation and adaptive process, nor its perceptions 
and effects over those in charge of implementing them, so as 
to ‘open the black box’ and understand how – and why – it 
functions – including what elements of the ‘PBF package’ are 
the most effective in that context. 
The independent research presented in this paper intends 
to add new evidence by investigating local stakeholders’ 
perceptions about PBF. It aims to analyse how the two 
different PBF approaches behave during implementation 
and what effects they produce over stakeholders in charge 
of implementing them. It investigates how local stakeholders 
whom implement PBF on the field (mostly health service 
providers) perceive the introduction of PBF, how they 
adapt the approaches during implementation (operational 
adjustments), and the behavioural interactions induced 
by the introduction of PBF in two health districts in 
South Benin – one supported by BTC and one by the WB. 
Especially, the study analyses how PBF is currently operating 
PBF from an actor’s point of view, thus looking for possible 
“policy-implementation gaps”, together with behavioural 
effects induced by PBF (search for a number of behavioural 
effects predicted by the literature, as well as possible other 
unexpected results). 
Methods
It has to be noted in the first place that what we call ‘PBF 
approach’ in this article may not exactly correspond to what 
the WB, BTC or the literature defines. Rather, we refer to what 
stakeholders call and accept as such. Indeed, as for any policy, 
there might be some gap between policy and practice. A first 
gap can be found between the PBF ‘pure approaches’ such as 
found in the literature (4,5) and the approaches developed 
in Benin. A second gap, which is more important from the 
perspective of sociology and grounded studies, relates to the 
divergences between what is supposed to be done according 
to the country frameworks, and what is observed on the field 
(which could be called ‘temporary results’). Being conscious 
of that, one cannot appreciate a policy or theory by comparing 
it to norms or other policies. A more appropriate position is 
to assess the functioning and effectiveness of a policy through 
analysing its implementation practices, its evolutions and 
the results it produces in a given context, based on how it 
is applied and how stakeholders perceive it. This is what we 
intended to do in this study. We do not investigate the first 
gap presented above, but we focus on the second one. We 
make no judgement about the WB and BTC approaches, but 
take them for granted and try to appreciate how stakeholders 
make it happen and implement that policy, what it becomes 
on the ground and how it behaves in stakeholders’ perception.
While to date, most evaluations of PBF in developing countries 
aimed either to describe and compare designs (17) or to assess 
its impact over health results indicators (18,19), a group of 
academics and PBF practitioners recently developed a more 
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comprehensive framework for monitoring and evaluating 
PBF, aimed at analysing its interactions with health systems. 
It is structured around five domains of: (i) context and its 
influences on PBF; (ii) development process; (iii) design; (iv) 
implementation; and (v) effects on health systems (3). The 
research presented in this paper inspires from this framework 
and mainly focusses on the fourth domain, namely how 
stakeholders implement PBF and what direct effects it has on 
their behaviours. Yet, the other domains are also investigated 
so as to better understand the processes at stakes. To be able 
to understand what is happening ‘inside the black box’ of PBF, 
this research also inspires from the actor-centred approach 
developed by Renmans et al. (20). Besides, the research 
intends to isolate, whenever possible, the influence of the 
various elements of the PBF ‘package’. Practitioners have 
identified a number of best practices and criteria to establish 
how far a project is ‘PBF’ (4,5). As some of these were still 
not effective when we performed our study and/or were too 
difficult to grab through interviews with local stakeholders, 
we mostly turned our attention to the following elements: 
performance premiums, overall resource increase, using 
indicators to clarify priorities, strengthened ‘vertical’ control, 
strengthened community control, increased management 
freedom, and capacity building initiatives provided in the 
context of PBF.
The research protocol (available upon request – in French) 
was conceived by a multidisciplinary group of academics 
and researchers, who also consulted practitioners. It was not 
approved officially by an institutional review board, but agreed 
with MoH officials. All interviewed persons were informed 
of the research and gave their consent. The research protocol 
rests mainly on a socio-anthropological approach and 
qualitative methods. It follows an inductive approach, based 
on the description and analysis of what we observed in the 
field, without intending to compare this to the norms written 
on paper in the programmes under scrutiny. The design rests 
on a case study in two health districts selected on purpose as 
one has been subject to the first pilot introduction of PBF by 
BTC, namely the district of Comè, and the other (Lokossa-
Athièmè) is supported by the WB in the same administrative 
department of the country – so as to ensure similar contexts. 
Within those two districts, the selection of health facilities 
was also done on purpose, so as to reflect varying viewpoints 
about the two PBF pilot initiatives. In each district, the sample 
included the District Health Management Team (DHMT), 
the technical assistant managing each donor’s programme, 
the district hospital and 5 to 6 health centres, until we reached 
saturation of information. Especially in the WB district, 
three health facilities included in the sample were under 
treatment, while three belonged to control groups (with/
without increased management autonomy). This enabled to 
widen the range of viewpoints, triangulate information and 
grab health staff expectations about PBF – even those who 
did not yet fully participate in the programme, but were 
exposed to some elements of the approach. The methodology 
for collecting information rested on observation and semi-
directive interviews supported by an interview guide. It 
was triangulated by document analysis enabling to collect 
quantitative data on processes and results. Beforehand, a 
rapid analysis of the relevance of PBF approaches in their 
context, as well as the formulation process (domains 1 to 3 of 
Witter et al.’s framework) (3) was led on the basis of document 
analysis and a number of interviews at central level. In 
total, 27 persons were interviewed in the district of Comè 
(2 belonging to the managerial hierarchy, 20 health service 
providers, 3 administrative staff and 2 technical assistants), 
19 were interviewed in the district of Lokossa-Athièmè (3 
belonging to the managerial hierarchy, 12 health service 
providers, 3 administrative staff and 1 technical assistant) and 
7 persons were interviewed at central level (donors and MoH 
representatives). Data was collected in early October (Comè), 
November (Comè and central level) and December 2013 
(Lokossa-Athièmè).
Witter et al. (3) highlight key questions for monitoring and 
evaluation and propose a systematic approach to monitoring 
the effects of PBF, but this was not sufficient to precisely guide 
our research. Thus we completed our analytical framework by 
identifying a number of behavioural effects that are predicted 
by the literature on PBF and more generally incentive theory 
(13,14,20,21). The literature indeed points to a number of 
positive effects of PBF over health system performance, 
notably with respect to increased efforts to meet the targets, 
but also in terms of increased management freedom and 
participation to evidence-based decision-making; but also, 
to possible perverse effects stemming from distorted efforts 
towards remunerated tasks. These general predicted effects 
were introduced in the interview guide. The latter was used as 
a checklist for data collection and analysis. It was structured 
against five main themes: stakeholders’ perceptions about 
PBF relevance, process and design; detection of potential 
policy-implementation gaps; positive/expected effects of 
PBF over health staff ’s behaviour; perverse/unexpected 
effects of PBF over health staff ’s behaviour; and effects over 
the health system, plus some information on costs aimed at 
cross-checking documentary information. Data was collected 
against this checklist and in a second step, qualitative data was 
analysed as usually in social science, through a contents and 
discourse analysis.
The results section below follows the structure of the 
conceptual framework developed by Witter et al. (3), focusing 
(except for the context) on stakeholders’ perceptions over those 
domains.
Results
The context
PBF has been initiated in Benin through pilot projects led 
by several donors. In particular, BTC initiated the payment 
of performance premiums in 2008 in the framework of a 
project supporting the district of Comè, and the WB started 
to conceive a PBF programme in 2008 as well. In addition, 
other donors also introduced pilot experiments notably at 
community level, notably UNICEF and NGOs. PBF started 
to be effective in the field in 2012. The MoH strongly 
supports PBF, this is why it was decided to scale it up with 
support from other donors (this should be effective in the 
beginning of 2015).
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Table 1. Main elements of comparison between the BTC and the WB PBF programmes implemented in Benin
Design element BTC approach WB basic approach
Launch of the process In 2008, in the framework of a project in the district 
of Comè
In 2008, through workshops and a study tour in Rwanda
Design conception ‘Ad hoc’ approach, developed through a 
participative, bottom-up approach by actors along a 
research-action; rests on existing institutions
‘Typical’ PBF approach adapted from the Rwandan approach; 
setting up of new governance structures
Purchasing of services The BTC project The WB project’s coordination unit
Who benefits from 
performance premiums
Health centres, districts hospitals and DHMTs Health centres, districts hospitals and DHMTs; later on the central 
level
Role of intermediate level Departmental teams strengthened and contracted 
out, in charge of peer verification
Departmental teams participate in verification, but are not 
contracted out
Districts concerned 5 districts in 2 departments 8 districts in 5 departments 
Main expected results Improvements in mother and children healthcare 
(rates), with special focus on indigent people
Improvement in mother and children health status (outputs), with 
special focus on indigent people (doubled premium for indigents 
taken in charge)
Number of quantitative 
indicators for health centres
10 -	 16 for health centres and 18 for district hospitals (at the time 
of our visit)
-	 22, mainly oriented towards mother and children health (from 
2014 on)
Number of qualitative 
indicators
-	 92 for health centres
-	 110 for district hospitals
-	 49 for DHMTs
At the time of our visit (new matrix to be used after):
-	 125 for health centres
-	 112 for district hospitals
-	 10 for DHMT
Targets Expressed in progress rates Same for all same-level facilities
Type and frequency of 
indicator measurement
-	 Quantitative indicators: monthly measurement 
out of facilities’ registers
-	 Qualitative indicators: quarterly measurement 
through peer review (team led by the 
departmental heath team)
-	 Quantitative indicators: monthly measurement by facilities’ 
teams
-	 Qualitative indicators: Quarterly measurement by DHMT and 
“district controllers” CDV Agency for health centres; peer 
review plus CDV for district hospitals
Verification process Rests on existing health sector institutions 
(department health team, peers) plus project’s team
Rests partly on existing health sector institutions (DHMT) plus 
independent CDV
Frequency of verification 
and payment
Quarterly Quarterly
Counter-verification Civil society organisations in charge of checking 
population’s satisfaction with health facilities’ 
services
-	 Community-based organisations quarterly verify quantitative 
indicators
-	 Community-based organisations and CDV biannually verify 
qualitative indicators
Payment of first premiums Comé: DHMT since first quarter of 2012, health 
centres since first quarter of 2013
Since October 2012 in the district hospital of Ouidah
Level and use of premiums -	 DHMT Comé: individual premiums between 800 
and 180 US dollars
-	 District hospital Comé: first premiums totalling 
about 9,500 US dollars, of which 70% were 
distributed to staff and 30% were used to 
functioning expenses. After repartition between 
staff, individual premiums varied between 80 
and 32 US dollars
-	 Health centre Houéyogbé (which we visited): 
individual premiums varied between 30 and 10 
US dollars
-	 About 400,000 US dollars expected per year per district
-	 Total premiums (all districts) raised from 437,000 US dollars in 
the last quarter of 2012 to 639,000 US dollars in the second 
quarter of 2013
-	 Some freedom is left as for use of premiums: some percentage 
is distributed to staff (according to their index level, weighing 
in favour of low salaries) and the rest is used to by small 
equipment, drugs and to realise activities
Total cost About 1 US dollar per capita and per year Total cost of PBF: 18 million US dollars over 3 years, that is about 
2,17 US dollars per capita and per year
BTC= Belgian Development Agency; WB= World Bank; DHMT= District Health Management Team;  CDV= Contract Development and Verification.
Source: Adapted from (6), plus information gathered from our field investigation
Table 1 below describes some characteristics of the two PBF 
designs analysed in this study, namely the BTC and the WB 
approaches. Even if comparing the country approaches 
with norms is not the purpose of this study, let us mention 
that the two approaches diverge from PBF good practices 
(4,5) at several respects, notably due to the relatively low 
amounts involved (compared to the standard of having a PBF 
programme budget of no less than 3 US dollars per capita per 
year, of which at least 70% is used for subsidies, community 
contracts and infrastructure input units) (4). Moreover, there 
is no real competition between providers, the private sector 
is not involved, and autonomy of health facility managers is 
limited and constrained by lack of capacity.
Perceptions about the formulation of the policy
Before launching its current PBF programme in 2012, 
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BTC had already tested the introduction of performance 
premiums in the district of Comè in a previous project. The 
system was not yet labelled ‘PBF’ even if it resembled it. It 
was developed through a participative, bottom-up approach, 
thus BTC built on that experience to design its approach, in 
an action-research dynamic. As for the WB, it mainly built 
on the successful and well-documented Rwandan experience 
(18,19). In the two visited districts, field actors regret not 
having been consulted during PBF policy formulation. Field 
and external actors perceive neither the foundations, nor the 
perspectives of the PBF policy. They welcome PBF but still 
do not have a sense of ownership about it, notably because 
it does not totally meet their expectations and constraints. 
Except for the previous BTC project, there has not been any 
public debate involving local/operational stakeholders about 
the diagnosis leading to the relevance and choice of the PBF 
approach2. Moreover, the coexistence of two approaches in 
neighbour districts disturbs health staff, especially in the 
district supported by BTC where healthcare providers feel 
injured because premiums are lower than in WB treatment 
districts. Some unfairness is also perceived by staff in the WB 
district’s control groups versus treatment groups.
Perceptions about the design of Performance-Based Financing 
approaches
The BTC approach rests on pre-existing bodies, notably 
for verification which is based on peer-review, plus 
community counter-verification. It does not provide very 
high financial premiums, except for the DHMT. On the 
contrary, the WB approach better suits international PBF 
standards  and encompasses the creation of new bodies for 
contract development, verification and coaching, which is 
delegated to an international cabinet, plus a local NGO for 
community counter-verification. The financial premiums 
are sensibly higher – except for the DHMT which had not 
yet received premiums at the time of our survey. In the 
district supported by BTC, health service providers suspect 
their hierarchy to monopolise the benefits of PBF, and thus 
would prefer having an independent body being in charge of 
managing it. However, other voices at central level fear that 
such an independent body entails high cost and may not be 
financially and institutionally sustainable after donors leave – 
at least as long as no institutional change is made to increase 
management freedom at operational level.
Under the two approaches under scrutiny in this study, 
performance premiums are granted according to the level 
of a limited number of quantitative indicators (see Table 1) 
which are measured monthly and checked quarterly, plus a 
qualitative checklist comprising a large number of indicators 
(92 for health centres, 110 for district hospitals and 49 for the 
DHMT in the BTC approach; 125 for health centres, 112 for 
district hospitals and 10 for the DHMT in the WB approach) 
which are checked quarterly by a specific PBF verification 
team. Interviewed health staff seems quite happy with the 
strengthening of verification which enables on-site training 
2. It has to be noted that the National Health Forum organised in November 
2007 which led to the adoption of the new 10-year national health development 
plan did not propose PBF as an option to be discussed by participants.
and has already enabled to build management and practice 
capacities. However, under the two approaches, interviewed 
actors have complained about the duplication of tools, as 
PBF matrices and supervisions come in addition to routine 
monitoring, for instance.
Nevertheless, health staff feels they have insufficient 
knowledge about how PBF is designed and especially how 
premiums are distributed among them.
More fundamentally, it emerges from our interviews that 
health staff perceives PBF as ‘one more project’ that is 
dissociated from other ongoing processes and reforms. 
In particular, PBF was not conceived in coherence with 
decentralisation (there is no role for decentralised authorities 
in the two designs under study), partial fee exemptions, and 
it is still not very clear how PBF scaling up will be articulated 
with the universal health coverage agenda and institutions. 
PBF brings additional premiums that pile upon many 
others and, as far as the WB project is concerned, is to date 
insufficiently integrated into sustainable institutions. PBF 
is not yet owned and viewed by health workers as a way of 
improving their performance; instead, priorities promoted 
through PBF are viewed as donors’ ones.
Perceptions about the implementation process of 
Performance-Based Financing
The two approaches have been implemented progressively; 
they have evolved during implementation so as to adapt to 
needs; and at the time of our survey, the WB approach was still 
only partially implemented, with some elements (community 
counter-verification and DHMT assessment) not being in 
place yet. For instance, under the WB approach, the DHMT 
was initially not granted any supplementary budget to do the 
PBF verification missions (which come in addition to usual 
monitoring and supervision), and therefore had to find other 
resources to do it, namely the funds collected from user fees. 
In some facilities supported by BTC, staff disagrees with the 
design of some tools (records…) required by PBF, and thus 
makes adjustments to them. A certain lack of transparency is 
also regretted at this level. However, globally, interviewed staff 
is satisfied with PBF and welcomes additional supervision 
and training being provided.
A major issue under both approaches is the perceived 
unfairness of PBF towards operational staff. First, healthcare 
providers under the BTC approach feel they receive much 
lower premiums than those enrolled in the WB project – 
even if this perception is somewhat biased because not all 
facilities are under treatment and receive high premiums in 
WB districts. More importantly, the commonly perceived 
unfairness of the system stems from the fact that (contrary 
to standard PBF best practices) the same indicators and 
the same quality checklist are applied to all health facilities, 
whatever their initial endowment and situation. Therefore, 
disadvantaged facilities which do not respect national 
norms because they lack material, equipment or staff, are 
automatically penalised, however strong efforts they make. 
Besides, so far the two PBF approaches neither include 
activities aimed at putting all health facilities in line with 
national norms, nor comprise special incentives to encourage 
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staff to work in disadvantaged areas. The BTC project initially 
had a budget for scaling-up health centres’ equipment, but 
this was converted into the budget necessary to finance PBF – 
so that some health centres keep much below national norms 
without having sufficient means to upgrade their equipment. 
Finally, unfairness is also perceived at the level of premium 
sharing – this is especially the case in the BTC district, 
where staff suspects its hierarchy to monopolise all benefits 
stemming from PBF, as confirmed by the level of premiums 
reported by the people we interviewed.
Perceptions about the effects of Performance-Based Financing
After only three quarters of implementation, in the two 
surveyed districts, PBF had already produced a number 
of positive effects on actors’ behaviour. If both donors 
acknowledge good progress in indicators, interviewed 
healthcare providers reckon that PBF forces them to depart 
from routine, to be more professional and to respect 
national norms, which was often not the case before. They 
have been sensitised to better welcome patients, to reduce 
absenteeism, to better communicate with them and with each 
other, to improve quality of registers and other data, to use 
it for management purpose and finally, to improve quality 
of care. As a result, the workload and time worked have 
increased, which is nevertheless insufficiently compensated 
by performance premiums. Moreover, while PBF encourages 
collaboration and teamwork within health structures under 
both models, so far it does not seem to foster collaboration and 
teamwork between levels of the health system under the WB 
model, probably because it relies mostly on external actors.
Not many negative effects have been detected so far, but we 
have gathered indications that the incentive to conform to 
norms and fulfil registers might be ‘seasonal’, that is, more 
efforts are being made in the few days before verification 
missions, so that one can question the sustainability of results. 
We also observed a few inclinations to shirking, frustrations 
and latent conflict between staff categories; and feel that 
premiums could quickly be taken for granted. Even after 
three verification rounds, the staff we interviewed started to 
feel blase about PBF and thus reduce effort compared to the 
second round. 
An interesting result from our study, which contributes to 
understanding what takes place inside the PBF ‘black box’, 
stems from the fact that, even if health staff often refer to 
financial premiums in their discourse, actually the latter are 
probably too weak—and ‘blurred’ into so many others—to 
have a real, lasting inciting effect. This is especially the case 
in the BTC approach since, as shown in Table 1, while the 
DHMT monopolised substantial individual premiums at the 
time of our visit, staff in district hospitals could only expect 
to get between 32 and 80  US dollars per quarter, and health 
centre staff only between 10 and 30 US dollars. It rather seems 
that PBF motivates health workers through other elements 
of its ‘package’: especially, regular formative supervisions 
have already enabled to strengthen management and 
clinical capacities, thus play an important role in improving 
performance. Moreover, PBF fosters emulation amongst 
health facilities as well as improvement in data collection and 
use for management purpose.
It is early to demonstrate effects of PBF on the health system 
but at the time we performed our study, one could already 
notice positive effects on the health information system. 
The share of performance premiums not being distributed 
to health staff was not yet used, but should be used to make 
investments enabling to enhance facilities’ capacities.
Discussion
Our case studies have methodological limitations that prevent 
from generalising results, as we only visited one out of five 
districts supported by BTC, and one out of eight districts 
supported by the WB. Furthermore, they were limited 
to studying the perceptions of local stakeholders, namely 
healthcare providers and a few administrative staff, technical 
assistants and managers. This might seem restrictive since 
PBF could be studied from many angles. Our study therefore 
deserves to be completed by other enquiries (notably among 
communities, facilities’ management committees, etc.) as well 
as by an analysis of epidemiological data under a sufficiently 
long period, so as to analyse PBF impacts. Yet, our study is a 
rigorous qualitative one, and the method used to collect data 
until saturation of information guarantees its robustness. The 
qualitative approach we used, namely interviewing health 
staff about their perceptions about PBF, enables to understand 
what sense local actors make from this approach which—even 
if supported by the central level—they perceive as externally-
driven (22).
Our finding that local stakeholders in charge of 
implementation adjusted theoretical approaches because 
they do not totally fit their needs and constraints is totally in 
line with what is often pointed out by socio-anthropological 
development studies (23). Stakeholders’ perceptions pointed 
to the risk that staff become blase with PBF and reduce their 
effort over time. This should be monitored closely during the 
pursuit of implementation, and a challenge will be to sustain 
momentum and ensure that premiums are not taken for 
granted by health staff, as it has been observed in the past for 
other premiums (24,25).
A more troubling and global finding emerging from our 
study is that thus far, PBF is not sufficiently anchored within 
a coherent and comprehensive reform approach. Stakeholders 
perceive it as some additional programme, and the two cases 
we studied rather constitute hybrid approaches containing 
partial elements of PBF juxtaposing on old rules and 
institutions.
A comparison between how the two PBF approaches under 
consideration in this paper are currently implemented and 
international best practices (4,5) points to some design flaws 
that prevent PBF to be fully operational. Especially, one 
can point the relatively low effective management freedom 
of health facilities (even those under treatment in the WB 
approach since they still rely on centralised resource allocation 
rules for most of their budget as well as for personnel 
management), the disconnection from other reform processes 
such as decentralisation, the duplication with usual activities 
(notably monitoring) and the relatively low budget of PBF 
(amounting to about 1 US dollar per capita per year in the 
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BTC approach and 2.17 US dollars per capita per year in the 
WB approach, which is judged insufficient compared to the 
international standard of about 3 US dollars (4,5).
A very good point for PBF in Benin however, is that the 
approaches implemented are centred on patients and 
improving quality of care. They have been initiated in an 
un-harmonised way, but actually have much in common—
especially the approach of limiting to a small number of 
quantitative indicators and a checklist of quality indicators 
linked to the respect of national norms—so that they could 
easily converge when being scaled up. The one and most 
important diverging element is about who supervises health 
facilities and verifies the validity of reported data: existing 
bodies (BTC approach) vs. an independent body (WB 
approach). The latter’s independence is likely to be more 
credible, but on the other hand it entails important costs 
(especially since currently the Contract Development and 
Verification (CDV) agency is an international one) and may 
not be financially and institutionally sustainable when donors 
pull out, so long as no comprehensive institutional change is 
made along the health system.
More generally, the total ‘opportunity’ costs of the two PBF 
approaches implemented in Benin are not known. The 
financial costs exposed above do not take account of non-
financial, ‘hidden’ transaction costs such as those incurred at 
all levels of the health system—and especially at the level of 
service delivery—by additional reporting requirements. This 
should be carefully studied so as to minimise ‘unproductive’ 
cost and favour financial sustainability in the long run.
Finally, other authors warn against the fact that PBF does 
not by itself reduce inequities in service provision among the 
population, unless equity targets are specified (26). In Benin, 
it is too early to study the effects of PBF on equity towards the 
population, but we have pointed above that existing designs 
are perceived as unfair towards health service providers. 
Moreover, experience shows that health service quality 
cannot be improved by acting on health providers’ behaviour 
only, but is also determined by other health system conditions 
– notably inputs and equipment (27). This argues in favour of 
investing in the first place so as to allow all health structures 
to respect national equipment norms before implementing 
PBF.
 
Conclusion
As a conclusion, in line with its objectives, our case study 
in two districts enabled to better understand how PBF is 
perceived by actors in charge of implementing it, how it 
is operationalised and what behaviour changes it brings. 
Stakeholders’ perceptions show a quite positive global picture 
of PBF. However, they also point to a number of issues 
which could jeopardy the success of PBF and thus should be 
monitored and possibly responded by policy-makers.
Especially, stakeholders’ perceptions pointed the issue of 
unfairness for health staff inherent in the two PBF approaches 
under study, which is illustrated by the fact that operational 
staff receive very low premiums compared to DHMT staff in 
the BTC approach, and that all facilities are subject to the same 
requirements while they do not have the same resources and 
assets. It appears crucial to try and reduce the perceived unfair 
distribution of PBF benefits among different programmes and 
staff, notably through enhancing all facilities’ capacities so as 
them to be in line with national norms; distributing premiums 
in favour of those who create results on the field; and possibly 
adapting indicators and checklists and/or providing extra 
incentives to encourage staff to work in disadvantaged areas. 
Finally, in view of scaling PBF up, our study also showed that 
it would be important to better communicate with field actors 
so as to guarantee its social acceptability and ownership, and 
to pay attention to the policy coherence as well as financial 
and institutional sustainability of the system over the long run. 
In-depth socio-anthropological studies could be very useful 
at those respects, to monitor and adapt the approach during 
implementation so as to align it with evolving health policies.
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